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ABSTRACT 
Using a new comprehensive tax-benefit model, JUTTA, this paper 
examines how labour supply incentives – both to participate in the 
labour force (the “extensive” margin) and to supply extra hours of 
work (the “incentive” margin) – have changed in Finland in 1995-
2007. The results reveal that the average participation tax rate has 
decreased by 10 percentage points to 62 per cent. Despite the 
significant improvement in incentives, some of the unemployed who 
have children, especially single parents, are still in an unemployment 
trap, i.e. the disposable family income does not significantly increase 
if the person is employed. We therefore present simulations where 
the social security system is reformed, without reducing minimum 
benefits, so that the income dependence of some of the benefits is 
reduced. This reform redistributes i n c o m e  t o  t h e  p o o r  a n d ,  a t  t h e  
same time, improves the incentives to participate in the labour force. 
We also compare the effects of this policy with those of a set of more 
traditional type of policies, consisting of across-the-board tax cuts 
and increases in income support. 
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 1 Introduction
Recent empirical work on labour supply has emphasised the role of participation decision
(often called the “extensive” margin), which has often found to be more important than the
decision on working hours (the “intensive margin”). This literature has been surveyed by,
for instance, Eissa et al. (2004). While working hours are typically very unresponsive to tax
changes (Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999), evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit in the
US and the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK suggests that the participation decision of
certain groups, such as low-income single mothers, can be quite elastic to the joint effects of
the tax-beneﬁt system when an unemployed person becomes employed.
The structure of labour supply responses also has important implications for the optimal
design of income maintenance and income taxation systems. Saez (2002) demonstrates that if
participation responses for low-income employers are substantial and the intensive responses
are small, the optimal policy may involve low, or even negative, marginal tax rates at low
incomes, which are then “paid back” by increasing marginal tax rates at medium and high-
income levels. This is in marked contrast to much of the classic analysis of optimal taxation,
initiated by Mirrlees (1971), that has concentrated on intensive responses and typically rec-
ommended high marginal tax rates at low incomes.
Theseﬁndingshavealsoinspiredinterestingpolicy-orientedworkonreformingthecurrent
welfare systems in high-income countries. An interesting example is the work by Immervoll
et al. (2007), who compare the distributional merits of the traditional type of demogrant policy
to those of in-work beneﬁts in countries covered by the EUROMOD microsimulation model.
With plausible parameter estimates, they argue, the in-work-beneﬁt policy leads to smaller,
or even non-existent, efﬁciency costs than increasing transfers to those not working. Method-
ologically speaking, they ﬁrst calculate the so-called participation tax rates, which measure
the beneﬁt for an unemployed person to become employed, then simulate changes to these
tax rates and ﬁnally obtain estimates of the potential employment effects. Bargain & Orsini
(2006b,a) perform a similar exercise for three countries, including Finland. They compare two
in-work beneﬁt schemes, one similar to the Working Tax Credit in the UK that is means-tested
based on family income and another individualised scheme.
The purpose of this paper is to present more detailed calculations in the similar issue on
one country, Finland. Using a new, comprehensive, Finnish tax-beneﬁt model, JUTTA, we
ﬁrst calculate how labour supply incentives have changed in Finland in 1995-2007 by calcu-
lating participation and effective marginal tax rates. We ﬁnd that despite a clear improvement
in labour supply incentives over time, there are still individuals whose participation tax rates
are so high that they gain little from becoming employed. These unemployment traps typi-
cally affect low-income families with small children, in particular, single parents. We then
propose a policy package that is intended to alleviate unemployment traps. A mechanical way
1to achieve this would involve lowering the level of income support for those not working. This
policy would, however, lead to troublesome distributional impacts. We therefore design our
“incentive package”, as we call it, so that it does not involve cuts to the social security level
but rather reduces the income dependence of some of the elements of social security, includ-
ing income maintenance systems and housing subsidies. We then compare the incentive and
potential employment effects of this policy with those of two alternative, more traditional type
of policies, including across-the-board tax cuts and increasing income support.
The paper is organised as follows. The second section describes the data and the mi-
crosimulation methods we use. Section 3 presents the evolution of labour supply incentives
in Finland in 1995-2007. Section 4 introduces the reform packages we consider and their
impacts on incentives and income distribution. Section 5 discusses the potential employment
effects. Conclusions are offered in Section 6.
2 Data and methods
We use the most recent Income Distribution Survey of Statistics Finland, from the year 2004.
The data describe the distribution of the annual income of households and income differentials
between different population groups. The statistics describe the amount of disposable income
and its formation from different sources when taking taxation and income transfers into con-
sideration. Income distribution statistics represent a sample survey whose ﬁnal sample size is
approximately 10,000 households. The data on households and their members are collected
with interviews and from administrative registers. In the interviews, the size and structure
of households are established and background data are collected on the household members’
occupations, activity on the labour market, dwelling, untaxed income and other matters that
have a bearing on the subsistence of households. The vast majority of data on income and on
classiﬁcation variables (e.g. level of education, marital status) are obtained from registers.
While the data are always based on 2004 values, we evaluate the effects of taxes and
beneﬁts based on legislation from various years, covering 1995-2007. This implies that our
results reveal the changes to work incentives that arise because of the reforms to the tax and
beneﬁt systems, and not because of changes in the population structure. This is a desirable
feature of the analysis, since the legislation part is something the government can directly have
an effect on.
Wedealwithtwomaintax rates. Theﬁrstnotionisaparticipationtaxrate, which describes
the incentives for becoming employed. This is an average tax rate, calculated for an individual
that is ﬁrst unemployed and then employed. The second concept is an effective marginal tax
rate, which describes the incentive to supply a small additional amount of work, either for an
already employed person or someone who is unemployed but has some part-time earnings.
2The participation tax rate is calculated following the idea in Immervoll et al. (2007). Let
us denote the direct taxes paid by an unemployed person by tu, and by tl the direct taxes
paid by an employed person. Similarly, the social security beneﬁts of an unemployed person
are denoted by bu and those of an employed person by bl. The net tax rate, , is deﬁned as
the difference between taxes paid and beneﬁts received, i.e. i = ti   bi, where i is u or l.
The participation tax rate is, in turn, the change in the net tax rate when a person becomes
employed. It is convenient to descrive this as a proportion of the gross wage the person can
earn when employed. This ratio is then the participation tax rate,




where w denotes the gross wage.
The practical steps to arrive at the participation tax rates are the following. We pick all
unemployed persons from the data and calculate the monthly net tax for these persons for
the unemployment months. We then convert the unemployed to full-year unemployed by
multiplying the monthly net tax by 12. We then estimate a hypothetical gross wage rate for
these persons with regression techniques. We run separate regressions for men and women and
take into account their education level, the ﬁeld of education, work experience, marital status,
earlier unemployment spells etc. The wage regression results are presented in an appendix.
These regressions are then used to predict the gross wages the persons would earn if they
became employed. With this gross wage, the microsimulation model is used to calculate the
taxes and beneﬁts for these hypothetical workers, assuming that they work for the full year.
The participation tax rate is then derived using the difference in the net tax when employed
and unemployed.
The microsimulation model we use, JUTTA, calculates all relevant social transfers (except
pensions) and direct taxes for all persons and households in the sample. When participation
tax rates are calculated, we ﬁrst pick from the sample persons with an unemployment record or
beneﬁts. Then those with partial unemployment beneﬁt are excluded and about 2 500 persons
are left in the sample.
Most of these persons have been unemployed only some months in the year, but in the
hypothetical simulation we ﬁrst convert them to full-year unemployed. Their earned incomes,
pensions and other individual beneﬁts (sickness and parental allowances, child home care al-
lowances and study grants) are eliminated, but the individual average monthly unemployment
beneﬁt is extended to the whole year. Unemployment-related training allowances are treated
in an analogous way.
In the second stage of the calculations these same persons have the predicted wage as their
income for 12 months. Now again all pensions and other individual beneﬁts are eliminated.
When we calculate taxes in this simulation, average work-related allowances (travelling ex-
3penses and trade union fees) are assumed.
In both simulations the housing allowance and the means-tested income support is calcu-
lated for all families in the sample. In the ﬁrst simulation, when the persons are unemployed,
these beneﬁts have quite an important effect. Also, in both simulations, families having chil-
dren under school age pay day-care fees according to the income schedule. Of course, the fees
are higher when the persons are employed.
If there are two or more unemployed persons in the same household, those beneﬁts or
payments which are not individual but take into account the whole household income are
distributed among these persons. This affects day-care fees, housing allowance and income
support.
Using the results of the two simulations it is possible to calculate the participation tax rate.
These calculations are repeated for different years of legislation: 1995, 2000, 2004 and 2007.
When the legislation year differs from the year of the data (2004), the monetary parameters of
the legislation are adjusted with the cost of living index.
The effective marginal tax rate is calculated for all households in the data set who have
wage income. It takes into account the increase in taxes paid and beneﬁts lost as a percentage
of a small wage income increase (1 per cent of wage income).
3 Changes in work incentives from 1995 to 2007
Work incentives among the unemployed – Participation tax rates
Changes in participation tax rates, which we interpret as being related to the incentive to
participate in the labour force, are tabulated below for different family types, age groups,
quintile groups of disposable income and the type of unemployment.
Table 1 presents by type of household the average participation tax rate (panel a), cell size
(panel b) and the population share as well as the number of persons who have more than 80
and 100 per cent tax rates, respectively (panels c-f). The overall average participation tax rate
has declined from 72.2 per cent in 1995 to 62.4 in 1997. Most of this decline – 5.6 percentage
points – occurred between 1995 and 2000, even if a substantial decline took place thereafter.
The share of persons with participation tax rates in excess of 80 and 100 per cent has also
declined quite substantially – both shares have been roughly halved from 31.8 and 5.3 per cent
in 1995 to 15.4 and 2.5 per cent, respectively. Thus, in the overall population, the occurrence
of very high participation tax rates, which leave no cash in hand from becoming employed,
affects but a small minority.
Figure 1 shows average participation tax rates conditional on the predicted monthly in-
come, based on a lowess smooth, across the years for the unemployed. We see that the shape
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Figure 1 participation tax rates by predicted monthly wages
Participation tax rate|predicted wage










































but the schedule declines across all wage levels. There is some tendency for the slope to ﬂatten
at a high level of predicted wages between 2005 and 2007. Note, however, that the steep in-
crease in participation tax rates about 1200 euros (which is our minimum wage) to 1500 euros
has, if anything, become more steep, even if at a lower starting level, between 1995 and 2007.
We next turn to the participation tax rates in different types of households, also shown
in Table 1. We see that the average participation tax rates declined in all groups, with lone-
and two-parent households registering the largest percentage point declines. However, the
rates faced by unemployed lone parents, especially, are still quite high – three-quarters of
every euro earned will, on average, be lost to increased taxes and reduced social beneﬁts
on their becoming employed. A comparison of singe persons with two-parent housholds,
both of whom started off with similar average participation tax rates, show that two-parent
housholds’ participationtax rateshave declinedby morethan those ofsingle (childless)person
households.
6Inspection of the shares of very high participation tax rates by household type also reveals
some differences, even if the direction of change is similar in all cases. The share of lone-
parent families with more than 80 per cent rates has declined from 67.6 to 27.7 per cent – a
large decline, but one which still leaves them with the greatest share of high rates. Notably,
the share of single-person households with more than 80 per cent rates also declined quite
substantially, from 41.2 to 13.8 per cent. (We should note that the statistical reliability of the
estimates per household type of persons with more than 100 per cent rates is in doubt, due to
small cell sizes.)
We show the participation tax rates tabulated across quintile groups of equivalised dispos-
able income in Table 2. We should bear in mind that these quintile groups are based on the
equivalent disposable income of the households in which the unemployed lived in 2004 (the
latest year of data at our disposal). Average participation tax rates declined across the whole
distribution of income. The participation tax rates are the highest at the lower end of the dis-
tribution – as one might expect, given that the low end receives most transfers. The decline
in participation tax rates has also been most pronounced in the lower end. Thus, the range of
variation in average participation tax rates has declined from (lowest to richest) 76.5–67.7 per
cent to 64.9–61.1 per cent, a substantial compression.
Participation tax rates by the type of unemployment a person has experienced is examined
in Table 3 and in Figure 2. While the average participation tax rate has declined in all cat-
egories – earnings-related unemployment compensation, ﬂat-rate unemployment beneﬁt and
labour market support, as well as the “mixed” category1 – the earnings-related category had
thehighestaverageratebothin1995andin2007. In2007, almosttwothirdsoftheearnedeuro
on becoming employed from earnings-related unemployment was lost to taxes. This contrasts
with the 57.7 percentage average participation tax rate that those on ﬂate-rate unemployment
compensation face.
The conditional mean curves, which related the average participation tax rate to differ-
ent levels of predicted wages reveal some interesting differences between the groups. Those
on earnings-related unemployment beneﬁts face a steep decline in rates at the low levels of
monthly wages, whereafter the proﬁle is quite ﬂat. The largest changes across time also occur
at lower levels of wages. The proﬁle for those on ﬂat-rate unemployment compensation, by
contrast, declines more evenly, even if here, too, the curve ﬂattens out at about 2500 euros per
month in 2007.
1The “mixed” cases are those who, within the sample, had received several different types of unemployment

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Figure 2 Participation tax rates by predicted monthly wages and type of unemployment com-
pensation
Participation tax rate|predicted wage; Unemployment category
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10Figure 3 Distribution of effective marginal tax rates

















Work incentives among the population – Effective marginal tax rates
We next turn to the effective marginal tax rates among the whole population. Figure 3 shows
the simulated distribution (as estimated by a kernel density) of the effective marginal tax rates
in 1995, 2000, 2004 and 2007. We note that the distribution in all years has two disctinct
modes, a lower one at 100 per cent and a more substantial spike near the mean of the distri-
bution. The spike in the density at 100 per cent declined after 1995, but was in fact higher in
2007 than in either 2000 or 2004. Thus, while reduced, we still have a substantial proportion
of the population who face very high effective marginal tax rates.
The more substantial spike close to the mean, by contrast, has moved substantially to the
left, indicating reduced effective marginal tax rates for much of the population. The largest
shift occurred between 1995 and 2000, but even between 2004 and 2007, the density moved a
little further to the left, reﬂecting lowered income tax rates across those years.
11Figure 4 Effective marginal tax rates by monthly earned income
Effective marginal tax rate|tax base
















































The change in the tax function, as measured by the conditional mean (lowess) curve for
different levels of the tax base (earned income) is shown in Figure 4. The predominant feature
of the change over time in this schedule is its steady decline. Note, however, that there is an
increase in the steepness of the tax schedule for very low monthly incomes between 2004 and
2007. The near-uniform downward shift in the tax schedule reﬂects the policy, followed by
the three governments in power since 1995 of lowering taxes by the same percentage amount
in all income classes.
In Table 4, we show the distribution of the effective marginal tax rates for different house-
hold types, as well as for the whole population. Between 1995 and 2007, the average effective
marginal tax rates declined from 53.4 to 42.0 per cent, a decline of 11.4 percentage points. The
decline in the average was the largest for single-person households and smallest for persons in
lone-parent households. We see from panel 3h that the share of lone-parent households with
rates in excess of 90 per cent did not change by much – from 15.8 to 13.3 – and that most
12of this decline occurred between 1995 and 2000. By contrast, we see from comparing panels
3e and 3f that between 1995 and 2007, the bulk of the population, in all household types, has
shifted from facing an effective marginal tax rate in excess of 50 per cent to one that is lower.
This is the tabulated version of the shift to the left in the large spike in the density, shown in
Figure 3.
We tabulate the effective marginal tax rates by quintile group of equivalent household
income in Table 11. The average rates, shown in panel 10a, are U-shaped, with the lowest
poorest and the richest groups having the highest rates – 48.5 and 44.5 in 2007, respectively.
The decline between 1995 and 2007 was the greatest in the poorest quintile group, which
started out with 62.1 per cent. Inspection of the distribution of rates, however, reveals that
the high average effective marginal tax rate among those in the poorest quintile appears to be
driven by the fact that more than one in four of them has a rate that is greater than 90 per cent
(see panel 10h. Thus, the very high effective marginal tax rates, the smaller spike around 100
per cent in Figure 3, is almost exclusively concentrated on the poorest ﬁfth of the population.
13Table 4 Effective marginal tax rates by household type
(a) Average
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 55.2 50.2 45.4 42.4
Childless couple 50.7 46.2 41.1 38.8
Lone parent 61.7 55.7 52.9 52.6
Two parents 54.9 50.8 46.5 44.7
Others 50.3 45.6 41.5 40.1
Total 53.4 48.8 44.2 42.0
(b) Cell Size
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 1388 1386 1371 1378
Childless couple 3100 3102 3053 3076
Lone parent 259 265 264 265
Two parents 2640 2665 2669 2660
Others 1649 1648 1645 1643
Total 9036 9066 9002 9022
(c) Tax %  20 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 0.9 1.7 6.8 11.9
Childless couple 0.7 1.9 6.8 10.5
Lone parent 1.7 2.5 3.8 4.0
Two parents 0.7 1.0 1.9 2.6
Others 0.9 1.6 4.9 6.0
Total 0.8 1.6 5.2 8.2
(d) Tax % 20   40 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 11.5 19.5 30.7 28.9
Childless couple 11.3 18.1 29.3 32.0
Lone parent 6.9 6.8 19.2 18.5
Two parents 2.8 5.9 15.3 19.9
Others 9.0 17.0 29.7 34.8
Total 8.8 14.9 25.8 27.9
(e) Tax % 40   50 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 22.0 50.4 46.7 47.6
Childless couple 28.5 53.9 54.9 51.7
Lone parent 10.8 47.5 43.4 46.4
Two parents 19.3 47.1 64.6 64.7
Others 31.6 56.1 54.8 51.4
Total 24.0 51.2 54.6 53.6
(f) Tax % 50   60 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 49.5 16.7 5.0 2.4
Childless couple 52.1 22.1 6.7 3.6
Lone parent 48.9 22.8 10.3 6.8
Two parents 63.1 39.2 13.0 8.0
Others 52.7 23.3 8.6 5.5
Total 54.1 25.1 8.1 4.7
(g) Tax % 60   90 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 3.7 0.7 0.9 1.3
Childless couple 4.5 1.2 0.4 0.4
Lone parent 16.0 6.2 10.1 11.1
Two parents 9.1 2.5 1.9 1.6
Others 4.2 0.6 0.5 0.9
Total 5.8 1.5 1.3 1.5
(h) Tax % 90  (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
Single person 12.5 10.9 9.9 7.9
Childless couple 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.8
Lone parent 15.8 14.3 13.2 13.3
Two parents 4.9 4.3 3.3 3.1
Others 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3
Total 6.4 5.7 4.9 4.2
14Table 5 Effective marginal tax rates by quintile group of disposable income
(a) Average
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 62.1 57.3 51.9 48.5
2 50.0 45.2 39.1 36.9
3 50.1 45.5 40.5 38.6
4 51.5 46.8 42.9 41.1
5 54.6 50.2 46.5 44.5
Total 53.4 48.8 44.2 42.0
(b) Cell Size
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 1361 1389 1380 1385
2 1382 1384 1370 1368
3 1649 1649 1632 1642
4 1930 1931 1918 1924
5 2714 2713 2702 2703
Total 9036 9066 9002 9022
(c) Tax %  20 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 3.4 4.9 16.6 26.9
2 0.7 2.1 8.3 12.0
3 0.6 1.3 3.6 5.7
4 0.2 0.7 1.8 3.0
5 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.6
Total 0.8 1.6 5.2 8.2
(d) Tax % 20   40 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 30.3 35.7 33.7 26.6
2 15.1 28.2 47.2 49.5
3 5.0 13.7 36.3 41.0
4 2.3 6.3 18.6 22.4
5 1.8 3.5 7.4 11.1
Total 8.8 14.9 25.8 27.9
(e) Tax % 40   50 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 14.4 15.5 12.2 12.2
2 42.0 51.2 35.7 31.7
3 37.3 69.0 55.8 51.3
4 24.1 72.7 75.0 72.4
5 9.0 39.8 71.1 75.2
Total 24.0 51.2 54.6 53.6
(f) Tax % 50   60 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 9.8 8.1 3.9 2.5
2 31.3 11.9 3.7 2.8
3 54.2 13.5 3.4 1.5
4 71.7 19.8 4.2 1.9
5 76.6 55.6 20.0 11.8
Total 54.1 25.1 8.1 4.7
(g) Tax % 60   90 (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 6.0 4.1 4.8 6.0
2 6.1 2.3 2.5 2.7
3 2.1 1.7 0.5 0.2
4 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
5 12.0 0.5 0.1 0.1
Total 5.8 1.5 1.3 1.5
(h) Tax % 90  (share)
1995 2000 2004 2007
1 36.1 31.7 28.8 25.7
2 4.9 4.4 2.6 1.4
3 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.3
4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total 6.4 5.7 4.9 4.2
15Table 6 Simulated and realised levels of inequality
1995 2000 2004
Overall inequality log(p90/p10)
Simulated 105:2 112:1 113:8
Realised 94:6 109:1 113:1
Inequality at low end log(p50/p10)
Simulated 52:8 58:7 60:0
Realised 49:2 56:7 59:3
Changes to transfers and taxes and the distribution of income
We close our examination of the changes in taxes and transfers after 1995 with examining
how the distribution of income has changed. As 2004 is the latest year for which the actual
distribution is measured, we stop our examination at that year. Our strategy here is the follow-
ing. We compare the actual change in the distribution of income with that which would have
occurred using the 2004 data but with taxes and transfers simulated in the years 1995, 2000
and 2004. We report the log(p90=p10), along with inequality below the median in the form of
log(p50=p10).
Overall inequality increased from 94.6 to 113.1, an increase of 18.5 points. When we
simulate the policy change, inequality increases from an initially higher level, 105.2 to 113.8,
an increase of 8.6 points. Thus, changes of tax and transfer policies capture a little less than
half of the increase in the gap between the 90th to the 10th percentile of disposable income.
Compare this to the gap between the median and the 10th percentile. The log ratio in-
creased from 49.2 in 1995 to 59.3 in 2004, an increase of 10.1 points. The simulated log ratio
increased from 52.8 to 60.0, an increase of 8.2 points. By simulating the 1995 legislation to
the 2004 data, we are able to capture about eight tenths of the actual change in the gap between
the 10th percentile of the median across these years. Put in other terms, changes in taxes and
transfers between 1995 and 2004 account for the vast majority of the relative decline of the
10th percentile relative to the median.
164 Reforming the tax and beneﬁt system
We compare three different reform models. Our main emphasis is on an ’Incentive package’
that is intended to decrease both the participation tax rate and the effective marginal tax rates.
Whileitwouldbe easytoreducetheparticipationtaxrate simplybyloweringthebeneﬁtlevels
for the unemployed, this would not necessarily be desirable from the distributional point of
view. Indeed, without distributional concerns, one could dismantle the whole social security
system and there would be no traps left whatsoever. We therefore design the incentive package
so that the minimum beneﬁt levels are not decreased; we rather reduce the income dependence
of many of these beneﬁts, with the intention that some of the employed would obtain some
beneﬁts as well. As a comparison, we also design a traditional type of packages, one with
across-the-board tax cuts and another with increases to the redistributive demogrants.
As mentioned, the incentive package is designed to improve the incentives to obtain work
and to accept small side jobs for the unemployed. Since most of those who face high partic-
ipation tax rates are families, many of the measures we introduce are targeted at low-income
families with small children.
The measures include the following:
1. Dismantling the means-testing of unemployment assistance. The minimum level of
unemployment assistance is now dependent on the family income. This means that if
an unemployed person decides to accept a part-time job, his family may lose income
because unemployment beneﬁts can decrease. The dismantling of this means testing is
likely to reduce the effective marginal tax rates of a family with an unemployed person.
2. The daycare fees are reduced for employed persons by letting a family earn 500 euros
earned income in a month without increases to the daycare fees. This measure is in-
tended to reduce the participation tax rate for families with children who are not yet at
school.
3. The earned income tax credit is made dependent on the number of children in the family.
The maximum amount of the tax credit is increased by 1000 euros per year for each
under-aged child. The credit will be assigned to the highest-income earner in the family.
Single parents obtain the credit themselves.
4. The system of partial unemployment assistance is made less dependent on earned in-
come. The unemployed person is entitled to partial unemployment assistance if he or
she earns part-time income. The maximum amount of this type of unemployment ben-
eﬁt is increased and the reduction percentage related to additional earning is lessened.
These moves are designed to cut the effective marginal tax rates for the unemployed.
175. The extent of means-testing of housing subsidies is reduced. The current system is very
complicated with different marginal effects if income increases. Sometimes the housing
subsidy is reduced by 40–60 per cent for each additional euro earned. The complicated
piece-wise linear housing subsidy scheme is replaced by a common income-dependence
parameter, meaning that the housing subsidy decreases by 16 per cent with a marginal
increase of income. This move will reduce the effective tax rates, but it also means
that households where one adult is in the labour market can still obtain some housing
beneﬁts. The latter effect is likely to affect the participation tax rates.
6. Income support is also made less means tested by increasing the amount of earned in-
come that the person can earn that does not reduce the income support. This measure
will mainly reduce the effective tax rates.
7. The universal child beneﬁts are increased for all children, and more for the children of
single parents. This policy will increase the family income for all other familes except
for those who obtain income support, since income support will be reduced by exactly
the same amount by which the child beneﬁts increase. Therefore, this policy change is
targeted at cutting the participation tax rates for families.
This policy package will be compared with a universal tax cut for wage income, where the
average tax rate is reduced by 1 percentage point for all wage-income earners. Notice that this
move will make labour income more desirable than transfer income, since the tax treatment
of the transfer income is not changed at the same time. Our other point of comparison is a
’poverty package’ where the mimimum beneﬁt levels are increased by cutting taxes on transfer
income and increasing the daily allowance for unemployment assistance and other minimum
level beneﬁts.
Table 7 compares the impacts of these policies on government revenues, household in-
come, poverty rates and the Gini coefﬁcient. The decile groups are based on the disposable
income calculated by the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale. The table reveals that both the
incentive package and the poverty package are strongly redistributive, reducing both poverty
and inequality, whereas families in the upper decile groups beneﬁt more from the tax cut. The
families in the tenth decile group beneﬁt somewhat more than those in the preceding decile
group, because of the large share of capital income in the tenth decile group. In the Finnish
dual income tax system, the tax rates on labour and capital income are not connected.
We use devices similar to those in Section 3 to examine the consequences of our sug-
gested reforms to work incentives. We begin by showing the average participation tax rates at
different levels of the predicted wage (Figure 1). The fact that the conditional mean curve is
virtually indistinguishable across any of the reforms underscores the fact that the reforms have
a very small effect on work incentives, at least as measured by the participation tax rate. Note,
18Table 7 Effects on total budget, income distribution and poverty
Incentive Tax Poverty
Costs (mill. euros)
Gross 586 616 649
Net 574 585 422
Changes in disposable income
1. dec. group 2.6% 0.1% 2.6%
2. dec. group 2.2% 0.2% 1.7%
3. dec. group 1.6% 0.4% 1.1%
4. dec. group 1.1% 0.6% 0.6%
5. dec. group 0.8% 0.7% 0.5%
6. dec. group 0.7% 0.8% 0.4%
7. dec. group 0.5% 0.9% 0.3%
8. dec. group 0.4% 0.9% 0.2%
9. dec. group 0.3% 1.0% 0.1%
10. dec. group 0.1% 0.8% 0.1%
Average. 0.7% 0.7% 0.5%
Poverty rate 11.9 13.1 12.1
Changes in number of poor persons
-49000 12000 -37700
Gini coefﬁcient 25.8 26.3 25.9
19Figure 5 Participation tax rate by predicted monthly wage (2004 euros)
Participation tax rate|predicted wage










































however, a small difference. The tax reform lowers the participation tax rate across all levels
of the monthly wage. The incentive reform leads to a little lower rates below approx. 2000
euros per month, and higher rates thereafter. There is, thus, a small rotation in the schedule
relative to the base case.
We tabulate the participation tax rates for the reforms by household type in Table 8, show-
ing, apart from the average (panel 7a), the share of those whose participation tax is in excess
of 80 (7b) and 100 per cent (7c). The average participation tax rate across all persons (panel
7a) is lowest in the tax reform package at 60.8 per cent, followed by the incentive package at
61.9 per cent. The comparison between the shares of persons with more than 80 or 100 per
cent participation tax rates, however, suggests the incentive package may do most for work
incentives – 12.4 and 2.3 per cent have rates exceeding 80 and 100 per cent in the incentive
package, respectively, while the shares are 13.2 and 2.5 per cent in the tax reform package.
Whether or not the tax or the incentive reform package is believed to be superior thus in part
20Table 8 Participation tax rate by household type
(a) Average
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
Single person 67.6 66.4 66.7 71.9
Childless couple 59.0 59.7 58.2 64.9
Lone parent 73.4 66.8 72.6 76.4
Two parents 64.9 64.0 64.1 69.1
Others 53.5 54.0 52.6 60.6
Total 62.4 61.9 61.6 67.6
(b) Tax >80 (share)
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
Single person 13.8 9.1 12.5 20.7
Childless couple 12.1 12.0 10.9 16.5
Lone parent 27.7 7.8 24.5 33.7
Two parents 22.5 18.2 21.1 24.5
Others 10.9 11.2 10.4 14.5
Total 15.4 12.4 14.2 19.9
(c) Tax >100 (share)
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
Single person 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.7
Childless couple 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.9
Lone parent 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.5
Two parents 4.9 3.3 4.9 4.9
Others 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.8
Total 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.4
depends on where – among the average, or at the extremes – one believes work incentive
problems to be most severe.
The estimated distributions of participation tax rates are shown for lone- and two-parent
households in Figure 6. It is very hard to see much difference between the distributions.
However, the incentive package seems to have an edge on the base and tax reform cases
among lone-parent households, in that the major mode among those for the incentive package
is slightly to the left of the others.
Turning next to the participation tax rates by quintile group of disposable income, we note
that the average participation tax rate in the lowest quintile group is lowest in the incentive
reform package. Intriguingly, only the tax reform package allows for lower average tax rates
in the remaining four quintile groups. The reform package designed to alleviate poverty, by
contrast, increases participation tax rates.
It is important to look beyond averages, however. The incentive package leads to a sub-
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22Table 9 Participation tax rate by quintile group of disposable income
(a) Average
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
1 64.9 63.0 64.0 69.0
2 60.4 60.6 59.5 65.8
3 61.1 61.9 60.3 67.5
4 61.0 61.1 60.2 66.7
5 61.1 61.2 60.3 67.2
Total 62.4 61.9 61.6 67.6
(b) Tax >80 (share)
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
1 17.1 10.0 15.7 20.3
2 11.3 10.8 10.8 14.4
3 18.8 17.8 15.4 24.0
4 16.7 16.6 16.3 22.8
5 9.9 10.0 9.7 20.0
Total 15.4 12.4 14.2 19.9
(c) Tax >100 (share)
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
1 2.6 1.5 2.5 2.2
2 1.5 1.7 1.5 2.0
3 3.7 4.6 3.5 6.4
4 3.6 3.6 3.6 5.3
5 1.3 1.3 1.3 4.0
Total 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.4
stantially smaller fraction of those with participation tax rates in excess of 80 per cent – e.g.,
10.0 per cent in the poorest quintile group, compared with 17.1 per cent in the base case and
15.7 in the tax package.
The tabulations of participation tax rates by type of unemployment compensation are
shown in Table 10. The average rates tell a similar story within different types of compen-
sation than for the total – the tax reform leads to lower average tax rates than the base case,
followed by the incentive package. The shares of those with more than 80 per cent rates sug-
gest some interesting differences, however. For those receiving earnings-related unemploy-
ment compensation, the aggregate ordering of reforms holds. For those on ﬂat-rate beneﬁts
or on labour market support, the incentive package leads to the lowest share facing very high
rates – 8.0 per cent and 5.4 per cent under the incentive package, as against 13.2 and 10.1 per
cent in the base case and 11.3 and 9.4 per cent under the tax reform package, respectively.
We conclude this section with a look at what happens to simulated effective marginal tax
23Table 10 Participation tax rate by type of unemployment compensation
(a) Average
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
No unemp comp NA NA NA NA
Earnings-related 66.2 65.8 65.4 70.8
Flat rate 57.7 57.3 56.9 64.5
Labour market support 58.2 57.4 57.3 63.9
Mixed 65.8 65.5 64.9 70.1
Total 62.4 61.9 61.6 67.6
(b) Tax >80 (share)
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
No unemp comp NA NA NA NA
Earnings-related 19.6 18.5 18.3 27.8
Flat rate 13.2 8.0 11.3 13.9
Labour market support 10.1 5.4 9.4 12.2
Mixed 19.6 16.6 17.3 22.1
Total 15.4 12.4 14.2 19.9
(c) Tax >100 (share)
Base Incentive Tax Poverty
No unemp comp NA NA NA NA
Earnings-related 3.6 3.1 3.5 5.3
Flat rate 0.2 0.6 0.2 1.7
Labour market support 1.6 1.2 1.6 1.3
Mixed 3.3 4.0 3.3 4.6
Total 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.4
24rates under the proposed reforms. Table 11 shows the average rates (panel 10a) along with the
distribution (panels 10c-10h), tabulated against quintile group of disposable income. Effective
marginal tax rates are, on average, 42.0 per cent in the base case. The incentive reform would
lead to higher rates – 42.5 and 42.2 per cent – while the proposed tax reform and the poverty
package both lead to lower rates.
Again, looking beyond averages reveals interesting differences. The incentive package and
the poverty package lead to a reduction of rates in the poorest income quintile group, while the
tax reform in fact increases rates for this group. The incentive packages, by contrast, increase
rates in the second group above those in the base case, while the tax packages lower them.
Looking at the distribution of the effective marginal tax rates suggests that the incentive
package reduces the proportion of households with very high rates in the poorest quintile
group relative to the other reforms and the base case. Comparing the shares of those with
rates in excess of 90 per cent and those with rates between 60 and 90 per cent (panels 10h
and 10g), the incentive package has 4.2 per cent with more than 90 per cent rates, while the
tax package has 27.4 with such high rates. Under the incentive package, 30.2 per cent have
rates between 60 and 90 per cent, the tax reform package has 5.0 with marginal tax rates in
this range. Thus, the incentive package substantially reduces the proportion of those among
the poorest quintile income group who face very high effective marginal tax rates. If we
believe that work disincentives are mainly associated with very high marginal tax rates, then
the incentive reform, despite not achieving a lower average rate, may lead to greater increases





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































265 Effects on employment
The JUTTA model is a static microsimulation model and thus does not contain any built-in
behavioural equations. To assess the employment effects of the policy reforms, we apply
the following, more indirect, approach. We ﬁrst divide the data into several groups based
on family structure and family income. We then apply different labour supply assumptions
regarding the different groups.
A key concept we use is the participation elasticity – introduced by Saez (2002) – which
measuresthepercentagechangeintheemploymentratetoapercentagechangeinparticipation
tax. The latter is equal to the percentage change in the difference between disposable income
when employed versus unemployed. Since we do not have precise knowledge of the size of
this elasticity, we present a range of results for different assumptions for the elasticity.
We follow Immervoll et al. (2007) and consider the following schemes for participation
elasticities
1. Homogeneous scenario, where the elasticity is
0.4 in the ﬁrst quintile group of disposable income
0.3 in the second quintile group
0.2 in the third quintile group
0.1 in the fourth quintile group
0 in the ﬁfth quintile group
2. Heterogeneous scenario, where the elasticity is
0.9 for married women with children and single parents in the ﬁrst quintile group
0.6 for married women with children and single parents in the second quintile group
0.4 for married women with children and single parents in the third quintile group
0.2 for married women with children and single parents in the fourth quintile group
0 for all other groups
In both these cases, the average participation elasticity is roughly equal to 0.2. The idea in
these scenarios is that, based on empirical evidence from in-work beneﬁts and theoretical
27Table 12 Employment rate, employed persons and the price per employed person in different
reform packages, %-points
Changes in employment rates by package, %-points
Incentive Tax Poverty
Equal 0.1 -0.00% 0.13% -0.93%
Homogeneous 0.05% 0.22% -1.43%
Heterogeneous 0.11% 0.24% -1.43%
Changes in number employed by package
Incentive Tax Poverty
Equal 0.1 -500 3100 -21800
Homogeneous -200 4600 -30600
Heterogeneous 200 5500 -34500





reasoning, low-income households are more responsive to tax and beneﬁt changes at the ex-
tensive margin. The heterogeneous scenario also assumes that the participation elasticities
tend to concentrate on speciﬁc groups, such as females who have small children.
In addition to these scenarios, we also present results based on a uniform elasticity of 0.1.
The reason for this is that in an earlier work (Honkanen et al., 2007), we attempted to esti-
mate participation elasticities based on Finnish data. We utilised the repeated cross-section
framework of Blundell et al. (1998), since we did not have panel data. In that approach, the
data is ﬁrst divided into a number of cells based on variables that can be assumed to be rea-
sonably exogenous to the tax changes, such as family structure, education structure and other
demographic factors. Based on data on group averages, we regressed changes in employment
rates on changes in the participation tax rates. The trouble with the Finnish evidence is that
there is little variation in the tax treatment of different groups, since the participation tax rate
changes were so uniform across income groups (see the analysis in Section 3). Therefore, the
parameter estimates tend to be unstable across different estimation speciﬁcations. However, a
reasonable summary point estimate for the participation tax rate was 0.1, which is why we use
it in the employment analysis below. The results are presented in Table 12.
As we do not pretend to have accurate information on the behavioural responses, the re-
28sults must be interpreted with caution. They nevertheless give information about the range
of responses one can foresee. The data in the table reveal that since the tax cut reduces the
participation tax rates, it leads to an improvement in employment rates; the increase, however,
is relatively small given the ﬁscal costs of this measure. The poverty package, which increases
the participation tax rates, leads to a small decrease in employment. The employment effects
of the incentive package are, however, disappointing. The reason is that the incentive package
includes both negative and positive changes to the participation tax rate. The positive changes
tend to concentrate on groups who have small labour supply participation rates. Therefore,
the overall ﬁgures are dominated by those groups whose participation tax rates do not decline
or who even experience a reduction in work incentives. This result highlights the difﬁculties
involved in getting certain groups employed simply by tax policy changes.
6 Concluding comments
This paper has examined the changes in work incentives for 1995, 2000, 2004 and 2007, as
measured by participation tax rates as well as effective marginal tax rates, using a microsim-
ulation model, with data for 2004. The results suggest that changes to taxes and transfer in
Finland in that period have increased work incentives in that both the participation tax rates
and the effective marginal tax rate have declined. The bulk of these declines for participation
tax rates occurred between 1995 and 2000. We also note that participation tax rates remain
quite high for some groups, in particular for lone parent households. Inspection of the dis-
tribution of effective marginal tax rates also reveals that while the bulk of the distribution
has shifted to the left – accounting for the decline in rates – there is a substantial part of the
distribution that remains at rates around 100 per cent, which has not declined substantially.
We experiment with three “packages” to further increase work incentives, one that is
speciﬁcally designed to increase work incentives, one that relies on income tax reductions
and one that is heavily targeted to the very poorest. The greatest average reduction in partic-
ipation and effective marginal tax rates is the tax reform package, but the incentive package
leads to the greatest reduction in those who have very high tax rates. This effect is particularly
pronounced among the poorest ﬁfth of households, where the incentive package leads to a
substantial reduction in those who have greater than 90 per cent effective marginal tax rates.
The changes in taxes and transfer between 1995 and 2007 have affected groups in too
similar a way to allow us to identify labour supply responses – the identifying variation be-
tween groups is simply not there. To assess the labour supply response of the different reform
package, we calculate the responses under different assumed labour supply elasticities. We
allow for both responses that vary across groups, with greatest elasticities among those with
low incomes, and for a uniform elasticity. Only the tax reform led to a substantive increase in
29employment.
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